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UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
APPALACHIAN VOICES V. STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD
912 F.3d 746 (4th Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
After the Atlantic Coast Pipeline was approved by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and
the Virginia State Water Control Board, environmental groups
petitioned the court of appeals to review the Board’s decision.
Environmental groups argued that the certification given by the
Virginia State Water Board to the Atlantic Coast Pipeline project was
arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found that the Board did not issue the certification arbitrarily and
capriciously and denied the petition for review.
Facts and Analysis:
The Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) was a “proposed interstate
natural gas pipeline . . . approximately 604 miles long and 42 inches
in diameter . . . [and] [a]pproximately 307 miles of the ACP would
traverse the Commonwealth of Virginia.”1 In order to get approval
for this, the Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) had to comply
with several federal and state laws.2
Atlantic had to receive authorization from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the Natural Gas Act (NGA).3
After authorization, FERC then “undertakes a review of the
environmental impacts of the proposed project under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).4 Then, FERC “coordinates the
required authorizations, including Virginia’s water quality
certification under the Clean Water Act (CWA).5 After this, Atlantic

1

Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Board, 912 F.3d 746, 750 (4th
Cir. 2019).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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needed and received an authorization from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers.6 Then, Atlantic needed a Section 401 Certification
through the state.7 The Virginia Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) was the issuing agency for this certification which
would approve the pipeline to cross wetland, river and streams.
However, a longer review was necessary for the upland impacts of
the ACP.8 Seven months later, the DEQ informed the Virginia State
Water Control Board (Board) that it supported the approval of the
Upland Certification for the ACP.9
Upon this certification, environmental groups filed two petitions
arguing that the Section 401 Upland Certification was arbitrary and
capricious for four reasons.10 The Board first argued that the groups
did not have standing but the court disagreed because “petitioners
successfully establish traceability and redressability given that we
could vacate the Board’s decision and determine that its decision was
not based on a reasonable assurance and instead was arbitrary and
capricious.”11
Holding:
The court of appeals had to determine whether or not the Board
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting the section 401
Certification to the uplands.12 “To survive review under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, an agency decision must show that the
agency examined ‘the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.’”13
The first reason the environmental groups found the Board’s
certification to be arbitrary and capricious is because the Board

6

Id.
Id. at 751.
8 Id. at 751–52.
9 Id. at 752.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 752–53.
12 Id. at 753.
13 Id.
7

Fall 2019

Legal Summaries

169

reopened the comment period.14 However, the court does not find
that to be arbitrary and capricious because the comment period was
“re-opened for the Wetlands and Streams Certification and not the
Upland Certification at issue in this case.”15
Secondly, the
environmental groups argued that the certification was arbitrary and
capricious because the State did not “conduct a combined effect
analysis.”16
However, the amount of different certifications,
approvals, and authorizations that Atlantic had to get for the pipeline
means that the Board and DEQ did not “duplicate[] the efforts of
other regulatory bodies.”17 The third argument is that the Board and
the DEQ should have conducted an antidegradation review and not
“relied on existing Virginia water quality standards and
regulations.”18 However, here, the court cites the CWA, which states
that “‘states have the primary role in promulgating water quality
standards.’”19 There was no need for the Board or the DEQ to
conduct a separate antidegradation review.20 Lastly, the court found
that “the State Agencies’ treatment of karst terrain was not arbitrary
or capricious because of the conditions imposed on the Section 501
Upland Certification.”21
“Karst geology refers to geological
formations of soluble limestone bedrock that creates underground
water flow systems where the rocks have dissolved and created
sinkholes, caves and underground springs and rivers.”22 When
determining whether or not to grant the certification, the Board and
the DEQ took these concerns about karst terrain into consideration,
meaning that this does not make the issuance of the certification
arbitrary or capricious.23
Ultimately, the Board and the DEQ considered the relevant
factors when giving the Section 401 Upland Certification, and that is

14

Id. at 754.
Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 756.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 758.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
15
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the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standard for whether an
agency action is arbitrary or capricious.24
Therefore, the
environmental groups’ petition for review was denied.25
Impact:
The impact of Appalachian Voices is yet to be fully realized. The
Fourth Circuit, in its holding for the Board, reiterated the standard for
how an agency can survive review of a decision that is being labeled
arbitrary and capricious. Here, the Board survived that attack
because the agency examined the relevant data and came to an
explanation for that action. If the court had found that there was no
reason for the Board’s findings, then the decision to give the
certification to Atlantic would have been arbitrary and capricious and
the court would have held in favor of the environmentalist groups.
CITY OF NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
913 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
Three municipalities, the City of New York, Philadelphia, and
San Francisco, all use the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System. This system helps combine information between
federal agencies and state agencies. These municipalities sued the
Department of Defense because the Department was not complying
with the system. The district court dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed.
Facts and Analysis:
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(NICS), is a program managed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).26 This program “facilitates information sharing

24

Id. at 759.
Id.
26 City of New York v. United States Department of Defense, 913 F.3d 423,
426 (4th Cir. 2019).
25
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between federal agencies and local law enforcement officials.”27
Three different municipalities sued the Department of Defense
(DOD) because the DOD was not providing the amount of records
required by the NICS.28 The municipalities wanted more thorough
compliance, but the district court dismissed the claim because the
appellants did not have constitutional standing and also “failed to
establish subject matter jurisdiction under the Administrative
Procedure Act.”29
The issue of the DOD not reporting enough information to NICS
has been an ongoing problem.30 Municipal appellants argue that if
the “DOD complied with its reporting obligations under the NIAA
[NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007],” the shooting in
Sutherland Springs, Texas by a former member of the military could
have been prevented, because the gunman had been convicted in
court-martial proceedings and should not have owned a gun.31 The
municipalities could not sue under the Brady Act or the NIAA,
because neither “contemplated a separate cause of action to compel
performance with inter-agency reporting obligations.”32 However,
the municipalities could sue under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), which “allows an aggrieved party to ‘compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.’”33
On appeal, the first question the court looked at was “whether the
municipal appellants have established subject matter jurisdiction
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).”34 The court
ultimately found that there was “no basis in the APA’s text for such a
broad incursion into internal agency management.”35 The court
turned to the definition of agency action which is “‘the whole or a
part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the

27

Id. at 427.
Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 429.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 430.
35 Id.
28
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equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act’” and is “limited to
those governmental acts that ‘determine rights and obligations.’”36
This narrow definition is to “ensure[] that judicial review does not
reach into the internal workings of the government, and is instead
properly directed at the effect that agency conduct has on private
parties.”37 These requirements apply to all challenges of agency
action.38
Here, when the municipal appellants want to compel information
from the DOD to aid their own local government, the court held that
they failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction.39 An issue is that
the municipal appellants do not “challenge a discrete agency
action.”40 In addition, the lack of reporting to NICS is a systemic
problem that will “likely require expertise in information technology
and deep knowledge of how military needs intersect with data
collection. In other words, it is exactly the sort of ‘broad
programmatic’ undertaking for which the APA has foreclosed
judicial review.”41
Holding:
Even though the court decided to reaffirm the dismissal based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the fact that there was no
discrete action in this claim, the court agreed with the municipal
appellants that “failure to carry out discrete obligations can be subject
to review. Government deficiencies do not become non-reviewable
simply because they are pervasive.”42 It will take years for the DOD
to implement reporting requirements, and “‘the obvious inability for
a court to function in such a day-to-day managerial role over agency
operations is precisely the reason why the APA limits judicial review
to discrete agency actions.’”43 Ultimately, while the APA does not

36

Id. at 431.
Id.
38 Id. at 432.
39 Id. at 432.
40 Id. at 433.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 433.
43 Id. at 434.
37
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permit this sort of judicial supervision, the court commends the
municipalities for seeking ways to keep their counties safer.44
Without a discrete action, the case had to be dismissed.45
Impact:
The impact of City of New York is the reaffirmation that the
judicial branch does not give direct supervision to agencies. In order
to rule on an agency action, the action has to be discrete. This
limitation is placed on the judicial branch because there are not
enough resources to be able to supervise the many different agencies.
An appellant cannot simply identify a government action that has had
a negative impact on them. Like in the present case, the lack of DOD
reporting to NICS about former servicemen who should not own
weapons, could affect law enforcement in these municipalities.
However, just because the DOD’s actions affected the municipalities
does not mean that the courts should get involved.
KEELEY V. WHITAKER
910 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2018)
Synopsis:
David Keeley, a lawful permanent resident residing in Ohio, was
convicted of rape. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decided
that his conviction was an aggravated felony under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) and Keeley could be removed without
possibility of relief. Keeley appealed this decision because Ohio’s
definition of rape includes digital penetration, which would not be
considered an aggravated felony under the INA. The Sixth Circuit
agreed with Keeley on the basis of statutory interpretation.
Facts and Analysis:
David Keeley was a legal permanent resident living in Ohio, and
a citizen of the United Kingdom.46 He was convicted of two counts

44
45

Id. at 436.
Id.
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of rape in 2011.47 Because of the two convictions, “the Department
of Homeland Security charged him as being convicted of an
aggravated felony under the INA and sought his removal pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).”48 Due to this, Keeley could have been
removed without the possibility of relief because “an aggravated
felony carries the most severe immigration consequence possible.”49
In August 2016, an immigration judge found that Keeley’s rape
conviction in Ohio qualified as an aggravated felony.50 Keeley
appealed to the BIA, and argued that “his Ohio conviction is not an
aggravated felony because Ohio’s definition of rape includes digital
penetration, whereas the INA’s does not.”51 However, the BIA
argued that the INA’s definition of rape also included digital
penetration, which meant that Keeley was guilty of an aggravated
felony, “making him ineligible for the possibility of relief from
removal.”52 Keeley appealed once more.53
In order to decide whether Keeley’s rape conviction in Ohio
could be considered an aggravated felony, the Sixth Circuit made
three different queries.54 The first was “identify[ing] the minimum
conduct required for a conviction of rape under the Ohio statute.”55
The second was “identify[ing] the elements of rape as it is used in the
INA,” through “the resources at [their] disposal, including the
common law, state statutes, and the Model Penal Code.”56 Lastly,
the court considered whether “the minimum conduct criminalized by
the Ohio statute ‘categorically fits’ within the generic crime.”57
As to the first point, the Sixth Circuit examined the Ohio rape
statute to determine the minimum conduct required for a rape

46

Keeley v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 878, 881 (6th Cir. 2018).
Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 881–82.
47
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conviction.58 The Ohio rape statute “defines ‘sexual conduct’ to
include the act of digital penetration. Digital penetration, therefore,
is the ‘minimum conduct’ criminalized under the Ohio statute for
purposes of our inquiry.”59 The second inquiry is more complicated,
because “Congress did not provide a definition of the term rape” so
the court “must ‘give the term its ordinary meaning.’”60 Because
Congress “added rape to the INA as an aggravated felony in 1996,”
the court analyzed the definition of rape in 1996.61 After examining
several tribunals’ definitions of rape, including the BIA, the
common-law crime of rape, state law statutes, and Black’s Law
Dictionary, the court concluded that “the generic definition of rape
does not include digital penetration.”62 The court articulated that
BIA’s decision to change course and include digital penetration in the
definition of rape “ignored the most important guiding factor to
statutory interpretation—the language of the statute—which shows
that Congress did not consider rape and sexual abuse to be
coextensive.”63 To combine digital penetration with the meaning of
rape in the 1996 statute “would strip meaning from the statute’s
words.”64 The court does not analyze the third inquiry because it
finds fault with the BIA’s interpretation of the term rape in the
second inquiry.65
Holding:
The court relied on Chevron to arrive at the conclusion that
Keeley’s rape conviction was not an aggravated felony under the
INA.66 When interpreting a federal statute, the court must discern
Congress’ intent.67 Here, “Congress considered rape to be a separate

58

Id. at 882.
Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 883.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 884.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
59
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crime from sexual abuse . . . it is undisputed that the generic crime of
rape in 1996—without considered sexual abuse statutes and
definitions—did not include digital penetration.”68
Furthermore, the Government in the present case argued that “the
BIA’s decision should stand because it avoids an absurd result.”69
However, the court notes that “the canon against absurd results
should not be used to create an ambiguity in the text of a statute
where none exists.”70 While Keeley could not be convicted of an
aggravated felony pursuant to this interpretation, the court
acknowledges that “he could still be subject to removal for
committing a crime involving moral turpitude.”71
Impact:
The immediate impact of Keeley was the court’s refusal to
categorize Keeley’s rape conviction in Ohio as an aggravated felony
for the purposes of removal. The impact over time is the potential
reiteration of looking to what Congress meant each word to mean at
the time the statute was written. Here, for example, the INA’s
aggravated felony statute was written in 1996. While modern courts
would likely include digital penetration in rape statutes, in 1996,
there was a separate statute for sexual abuse. The Sixth Circuit
strictly interpreted the statute.
MONTROIS V. UNITED STATES
916 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
A group of tax-return preparers filed a class action lawsuit against
the Internal Revenue Service alleging that the fee to obtain a Preparer
Tax Identification Number was arbitrary and capricious. The court
found that the IRS acted within its authority under the Independent

68

Id.
Id.
70 Id. at 885.
71 Id.
69
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Offices Appropriations Act and that the decision to implement the fee
was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Facts and Analysis:
Tax-return preparers prepare tax returns for taxpayers.72 The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began requiring tax-return preparers
to obtain “a unique identifying number known as a Preparer Tax
Identification number, or PTIN.”73 The PTIN had to be renewed
annually, and the fee to obtain and renew the PTINs was “designed to
recoup the costs to the agency of issuing and maintaining a database
of PTINs.”74 The IRS used its authority under the Independent
Offices Appropriations Act to require a fee, because the Act “allows
federal agencies to charge fees for services in certain conditions.”75
This group of tax-return preparers argued that the IRS did not
have authority under the Independent Offices Appropriations Act to
charge a fee and also that the decision to implement the fee was
arbitrary and capricious. The district court agreed and ordered the
IRS to stop charging the PTIN fee and also to refund the fees already
paid.76 The court here disagreed and argued that the IRS did have
authority under the Act and that the decision to do so was neither
arbitrary nor capricious.77
The reason the IRS began to implement regulations on tax-return
preparers is because it felt that “many taxpayers were being ‘poorly
served by some tax return preparers’ due to preparers’ inadequate
education and training as well as deficiencies in the agency’s
compliance regime.”78 Tax-return preparers do not have to have any
formal education and anyone can be a registered tax-return payer as
long as they pass a “background check, pass a competency exam, and
satisfy continuing education requirements.”79 So, the IRS

72

Montrois v. United States, 916 F.3d 1056, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1059.
79 Id.
73

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

178

39-1

implemented a “credentialing and registration regime for tax-return
preparers.”80 The IRS also “required preparers to obtain a PTIN and
renew it annually.”81 Lastly, the IRS “decided it would charge taxreturn preparers a fee of roughly $50 (plus a vendor fee) to obtain
and renew a PTIN.”82 This fee would cover costs of the technology
system, and other support needed to evaluate and enforce tax-return
preparers.83
The court examines whether or not it has jurisdiction over this
case and holds that it does have jurisdiction because the tax-return
preparers were not required “to submit their claims to the IRS before
bringing this action in federal court.”84
The tax-return preparers argue that the fee is unlawful for two
reasons.
First, they argued that “the Independent Offices
Appropriations Act does not provide statutory authority for the fee.
Second, they contend that the IRS’s decision to impose the fee was
arbitrary and capricious.”85
Holding:
The court disagrees with both of these contentions.86 To the first
argument, the court counters with the fact that under the Independent
Offices Appropriations Act, the “‘head of each agency . . . may
prescribe regulations establishing the charge for a service or thing of
value provided by the agency.’”87 To justify a fee, the agency must
show that “it provides some kind of service in exchange for the fee . .
. that the service yields a specific benefit, and . . . that the benefit is
conferred upon identifiable individuals.”88 The court holds that the
IRS meets all three requirements.89 The IRS provides “the service of

80

Id.
Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1062.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1062–63.
89 Id. at 1063.
81
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providing tax-return preparers a PTIN.”90 The IRS also provides a
specific benefit—“the PTIN helps protect tax-return preparers’
identities by allowing them to list a number on returns other than
their social security number.”91 Lastly, the benefit is conferred upon
identifiable individuals because “[t]ax-return preparers as a group
qualify as identifiable recipients for purposes of justifying a fee
assessed under the Independent Offices Appropriations Act.”92
The court holds that the decision to require a PTIN fee was not
arbitrary and capricious.93 This fee does not fall outside of the IRS’s
regulatory authority because “the fee is ‘based on direct costs of the
PTIN program, which include staffing and contract-related costs for
activities, processes, and procedures related to the electronic and
paper registration and renewal submissions.’”94
Impact:
The impact of Montrois is the importance of the three factors that
justify a fee under the Independent Offices Appropriations Act.
Without meeting the three requirements of providing a service that
yields a specific benefit to identifiable individuals, an agency could
not justify its fee. Here, the IRS did meet those requirements, and the
PTIN fee was justifiable.
ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY PILOTS ASSOCIATION V. UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD
357 F.Supp.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
Synopsis:
The St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association sued the United
States Coast Guard after the Coast Guard promulgated a rule that
excluded legal fees as reimbursable if the fees were sustained in a
suit against the United States government. The pilots associations

90

Id.
Id.
92 Id. at 1066.
93 Id. at 1067.
94 Id.
91
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declared that the rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court agreed,
stating that the Coast Guard did not acknowledge the change during
the rulemaking, nor did it offer a reasoned explanation for the
change. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.
Facts and Analysis:
In 1960, the Great Lakes Pilotage Act required foreign-owned
shipping vessels to employ “registered, experienced American or
Canadian seaway pilots to navigate American portions of the St.
Lawrence Seaway or the Great Lakes.”95 The Secretary of Homeland
Security was to set the rates, but delegated that to the Great Lakes
Pilotage Office of the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard),
“which has promulgated regulations establishing the methods by
which rates are set.”96 The goal for the rates was to “‘promote safe,
efficient, and reliable pilotage service on the Great Lakes, by
generating for each pilotage association sufficient revenue to
reimburse its necessary and reasonable operating expenses, fairly
compensate trained and rested pilots, and provide an appropriate
profit to use for improvements.’”97 Simply, the rates were to be
necessary and reasonable.98
However, in 2016, the Coast Guard changed the way that the
rates were set.99 Similar to previous years, pilots would “detail their
expenses,” which “obligates the Coast Guard to determine whether
an expense is both ‘necessary’ for providing pilotage services and
‘reasonable’ in amount.”100 But, “the new Rule treats legal fees
incurred in litigation against the U.S. government differently than
other legal fees. Under the new regulation, ‘association [legal]
expenses are recognizable except for any and all expenses associated
with legal action against the U.S. government or its agents.’”101

95 St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association v. United States Coast Guard, 357
F.Supp.3d 30, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 33.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 33–34.
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When the Coast Guard “engaged in a notice-and-comment
rulemaking to set rates for the 2017 shipping season,” the pilots
associations requested the Coast Guard to recognize the legal
expenses incurred from three years prior.102 Rulemaking was always
based on expenses incurred three years prior.103 The Coast Guard
responded that those costs were no longer covered.104 The pilots
associations argued that the Coast Guard promulgated that rule in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.105
The court’s review of an agency action is narrow, and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) “precludes the court from
‘substitu[ing] its judgment for that of the agency.’”106 Instead, the
court must “determine whether the agency ‘examine[d] the relevant
data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its actions,
including a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.’”107
Holding:
The holding in St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association hinges on
the fact that during the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the
Coast Guard did not acknowledge “a significant overhaul of ratesetting methodology.”108 When the pilots associations commented
on the new methodology, the Coast Guard still did not acknowledge
it in the final rulemaking.109 It responded to the pilots associations’
comments with “‘we disagree.’”110 The court states that “‘[a] central
principle of administrative law is that, when an agency decides to
depart from . . . past practices and official policies, the agency must

102

Id. at 34.
Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 35.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 36.
109 Id.
110 Id.
103
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at a minimum acknowledge the change and offer a reasoned
explanation for it.’”111
The Coast Guard did not acknowledge the change or offer an
explanation.112 The court highlighted that “[t]he fact that Plaintiffs
were able to identify the change in policy does not absolve the Coast
Guard of its obligation to engage in reasoned decision-making, which
starts with acknowledging a deliberate change.”113 The court also
iterates that it does not rule on whether or not the policy is wise, or
needed.114 Instead, the way that the Coast Guard implemented the
change was arbitrary and capricious.115 The pilots associations’
motion for summary judgment is granted.116
Impact:
The impact of this case is the reiteration of the procedure behind
promulgating rules, and a reaffirmation that the court does not look at
the substance or wisdom of the rules promulgated, but merely the
procedure behind it. The Coast Guard did not acknowledge its
change in rules regarding reimbursement in the NPRM, and when the
pilots associations commented regarding the lack of reimbursement
for legal fees incurred against the United States, the Coast Guard
stated that it disagreed. The Coast Guard should have explained the
rule change. This is an example of the importance of following the
procedures under the APA.
W.G.A. V. SESSIONS
900 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2018)
Synopsis:
W.G.A. was threatened by members of an El Salvadoran gang
and fled to the United States. He was caught and put into removal

111

Id.
Id. at 37.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 38.
115 Id.
116 Id.
112
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proceedings, and then applied for asylum under Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge and the Board
of Immigration Appeals denied his application. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed and remanded W.G.A.’s case back to the Board of
Immigration Appeals on the basis that W.G.A. actually does qualify
for asylum.
Facts and Analysis:
In 2013, the rural community where W.G.A. grew up was
infiltrated by the Mara 18 gang.117 The Mara 18 one of two
dangerous street gangs in El Salvador.118 Between Mara 18 and MS13, these gangs “use violence to exercise an enormous degree of
social control over their territories.”119 Both Mara 18 and MS-13
have extorted millions, conducted labor strikes, controlled political
campaigns, and are usually above the law.120 In 2014, W.G.A.’s
younger brother, S.R.P., did not come home from the store.121
Months later, W.G.A. received a call from S.R.P.122 S.R.P. was
afraid that the gang was going to kill him and hung up without giving
W.G.A. much information.123 W.G.A. and his mother did not contact
the police, “because they felt it would be useless . . . Others had
disappeared after reporting crimes to the police.”124 A few months
later, S.R.P. was arrested, and at his court proceeding, he had a gang
tattoo on his hand.125 Because S.R.P. did not want to be in the gang
anymore, he did “not come home for fear of what the gang would
do.”126 He did not tell his family where he was going.127 The day
after S.R.P. disappeared, W.G.A. received a phone call from a man

117

W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 961.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
118
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who told him to “‘be careful’ and that ‘they’re looking for you.’”128
The following day, “four tattooed gang members approached W.G.A.
at his house.”129 After throwing W.G.A. to the ground and putting a
gun to his head, one of the gang members said “‘if you don’t hand
over your brother, you’re going to die here.’ The men told W.G.A.
that he had four days to comply or they would kill him.”130 The men
also threated to kill him and his family if they contacted the police.131
Two days after this incident, W.G.A. fled to the United States
because he was afraid that the gang members would kill him.132 The
gang members continued to threaten W.G.A.’s family, and W.G.A.’s
other brother went into hiding.133
Upon arriving in the United States through Texas, W.G.A. was
apprehended and the Department of Homeland Security “initiated
removal proceedings against him.”134 W.G.A. “conceded that he was
removable . . . [but] applied for asylum.”135 Both the immigration
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals found that “W.G.A. did
not qualify for any of his asserted grounds of relief and ordered
removal.”136
This court had to determine what the scope of review was when
deciding this case, which hinged on whether or not “the Board’s
order is independent of or supplemented the immigration judge’s
decision.”137 Because the Board’s order was supplementary to the
immigration judge’s decision, this court can “review the immigration
judge’s findings as supplemented by the Board’s.”138
“To qualify for asylum, W.G.A. must show that he is ‘unable or
unwilling to return’ to El Salvador ‘because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution’ . . . ‘on account of’ one of five protected
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grounds: ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.’”139 Here, W.G.A has shown that
Mara 18 has persecuted him in the past.140 However, the issue is
“whether the persecution was motivated by a reason covered by the
asylum statutes.”141 W.G.A. claims that he was targeted by Mara 18
because of “his membership in two particular social groups: (1)
members of his nuclear family or (2) family members of tattooed
former Salvadoran gang members.”142 While the immigration judge
and the Board did not believe that W.G.A.’s persecution was directly
connected to his membership in these groups, the court here holds
that W.G.A. has “identified a cognizable social group and that the
record compels the conclusion that the Mara 18 persecuted him on
account of his membership in it.”143
Holding:
The immigration judge and the Board both found that W.G.A.
was a part of the cognizable social group of “members of his nuclear
family.”144 Because the membership element was met, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit does not “resolve the Chevron
question regarding the family members of former gang members.”145
Secondly, the court found that W.G.A.’s membership in his family
was “one central reason for the persecution that both sides agree he
suffered.”146 The court goes on to highlight W.G.A.’s testimony as
well as country reports that “corroborate this testimony and
demonstrate widespread recognition that the Salvadoran gangs target
nuclear family units to enforce their orders and to discourage
defection.”147 Specifically, a “report by the U.S. Department of State
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says that ‘the families of gang members often face the same risks of
being killed or disappearing as the gang members themselves.”148
Lastly, the court concluded that under Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture, W.G.A. would “not have to show that the torture
relates to any protected grounds. But the torture must be ‘inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official.’”149 Therefore, the court here remands W.G.A.’s claim for
deferred removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture
because W.G.A. has shown that he has been tortured in the past, and
it will continue in the future.150 The standard does not require a
public official to be directly involved, but country reports show that
there is an extensive record regarding corruption within the
government of El Salvador.151 In conclusion, W.G.A.’s case was
remanded.
Impact:
One of the impacts of W.G.A. is the idea that when the Board of
Immigration issues an opinion that is supplementary to the
immigration judge’s decision, the appellate court can examine not
only the Board of Immigration’s holding, but also the immigration
judge’s opinion. This ultimately gets decided on a case by case basis,
but it expands the scope of review of the appellate court.
Furthermore, a factual finding on an asylum claim can only be
reversed by a Court of Appeals if “the evidence compels a different
result” which was the case here in W.G.A.152
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
HADWAN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
340 F.Supp.3d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Synopsis:
The Department of State revoked Mansoor Hadwan’s passport
and his Consular Report of Birth Abroad. Under the Mandamus and
the Administrative Procedures Act, Hadwan sought to supplement
the administrative record with evidence about the State Department’s
proxy denaturalization program. Because the court found that the
State Department did not act in bad faith, and because there was no
other particularized need, Hadwan’s motion was denied.
Facts and Analysis:
In June 2013, Mansoor Hadwan went to the United States
Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen.153 He was applying for immigration
benefits for his family.154 However, when he was there, Hadwan
says that officials at the Embassy took his passport and his U.S.
Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA).155 He alleges that
“Embassy officials conditioned the return of his passport and CRBA
on his completion of a number of forms.”156 Hadwan filled out the
forms and says that he was told the documents would be sent to
him.157 In March 2014, Hadwan was told that his passport and
CRBA were revoked because “the forms he executed included
admissions that his biological father was not a U.S. citizen and that
he had lied on his passport and CRBA applications.”158 Hadwan,
who does not speak or write English, claimed that these statements
were coerced and that “he did not understand what he was
153
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signing.”159 A few months later, in August 2014, there was a
revocation hearing held by the State Department, but Hadwan could
not attend because “he was denied a one-time passport to attend that
hearing.”160 Hadwan’s attorney argued that “Hadwan did not sign
the form voluntarily” but the Government rebutted that claim with
the fact that “the document stated that it ‘was read to me in Arabic
and I understood the contents completely.’”161 In March 2015, the
State Department found that “Hadwan admitted to supplying false
information in his passport and CRBA applications and affirmed
their revocation.”162
Once his passport and CRBA were revoked, Hadwan sought to
supplement the administrative record under the Mandamus Act and
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).163 Hadwan wanted to add
evidence “concerning ‘the implementation of the State Department’s
proxy denaturalization program and consulate decisions . . . .’”164
Hadwan believed that “the administrative record is ‘devoid of any
record of how and why the Department of State decided that [he] was
not who he purported to be.’”165 Hadwan also believed that there
were illegal coercions and interrogations by agency employees and
that the Department of State was “strip[ping] passports from
American citizens in Yemen.”166
The Government argued that “Hadwan has not ‘made a strong
showing or demonstrated a particularized need for the extra-record
discovery . . . nor has be demonstrated the existence of any of the
narrow and rare circumstances under which discovery may be
appropriate against the government in an APA review case.’”167
Furthermore, the Government argued that “a court reviewing an
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agency decision is confined to the administrative record compiled by
that agency when it made the decision.”168
Holding:
The holding in Hadwan was based off of the premise that there
are two categories in which the administrative record can be
supplemented.169 The first reason is “‘the party may seek to show
that materials exist that were actually considered by the agency
decision-makers but are not in the record as filed.’”170 The second is
that a “party may seek extra-record evidence” upon a “strong
showing in support of a claim of bad faith or improper behavior on
the part of the agency decision makers or where the absence of
formal administrative findings makes such investigation necessary . .
. to determine the reasons for the . . . decision.’”171 Hadwan’s motion
to supplement the administrative record was ultimately denied
because his reasons did not fall into either of these categories.172
Courts will not “‘ascribe . . . nefarious motives to agency action as a
general matter.”173 The court then discusses a couple of exceptions,
one being that the administrative record can be supplemented if the
“evidentiary record is inadequate, but those materials must merely be
explanatory of the original record and should advance no new
rationalizations.”174 Also, the court holds that it will allow for
background information “when confronted with complex issues or to
determine whether the agency considered all relevant factors in
making its decision.”175 Hadwan “offer[ed] nothing more than bare
assertions that the statement was coerced.”176 Ultimately, the court
held that there needs to be a “strong showing of bad faith to warrant

168

Id. at 355.
Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 357.
173 Id. at 356.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
169

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

190

39-1

extra-record discovery or record supplementation.”177 The court
“will not assume an agency acted in bad faith simply because it
exercised its discretion.”178
Impact:
The full impact of Hadwan is yet to be realized. However, the
important conclusion from this case is that the court needs a showing
that an agency is acting in bad faith. Without that showing, the court
will side with the agency and defer to its discretion. Here, there was
no showing that the State Department acted in bad faith, so the court
denied Hadwan’s motion to supplement the administrative record.
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STATE APPELLATE COURTS
LAPERCHE V. CITY OF PEEKSKILL
162 A.D.3d 665 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)
Synopsis:
Douglas LaPerche was a police officer in the City of Peekskill.
Officer LaPerche had sustained injuries that caused him to be out of
work. He applied for benefits because his absence was related to a
prior injury. The Chief of Police denied the application due to
procedural errors in Officer Peekskill’s request. The court ruled that
denying these benefits based solely on procedural grounds was an
abuse of discretion.
Facts and Analysis:
Officer Douglas LaPerche, during his time as a police officer in
the City of Peekskill, sustained injuries on September 18, 2011 and
December 24, 2012.179 Officer LaPerche reported both of these
injuries and received benefits each time under General Municipal
Law section 207-c.180 However, a couple of years later, on May 23,
2015, Officer LaPerche said that he would be out of work until June
10, 2015 until he had seen his orthopedist.181 He applied for benefits
because “his absence was related to the prior injuries sustained on
September 18. 2011, and December 24, 2012.”182 However, the
Chief of Police of the City of Peekskill denied the application
because “the petitioner failed to follow the procedures relating to the
application for such benefits as outlined in the collective bargaining
agreement between the petitioner’s union and the respondent.”183
Officer LaPerche was required to submit a report within 24 hours of
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the incident which “gave rise to the disability.”184 However, the
incident was years before.
Judicial review of an administrative determination is “limited to
the question of whether the determination was ‘made in violation of
lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary
and capricious or an abuse of discretion.’”185 The court also states
that a “determination is arbitrary and capricious if it lacks a rational
basis.”186
Holding:
Here, the court found that the “failure to submit an incident report
within the 24-hour time limit may be excused by the respondent ‘in
appropriate cases.’”187 The court argued that under these
circumstances, “it was arbitrary and capricious for the respondent not
to offer the petitioner the opportunity to seek to excuse any technical
violations of these procedures.”188 It would be an abuse of discretion
to deny Officer LaPerche’s application for benefits due to a
procedural error alone.189
Impact:
The impact of LaPerche is the reaffirmation that an
administrative determination is arbitrary and capricious if it lacks a
rational basis. Here, there was no rational basis for denying Officer
LaPerche’s application based on a procedural error. Furthermore,
judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to
whether or not the decision was based on an error of law or if there
was an abuse of discretion. The judicial branch is not provided much
leeway in examining administrative decisions.
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